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Summary. Short-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are intro-
duced in a simple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium utilities correspond-
ing to militant union behaviour are independent of the contract length. Necessary
and sufficient conditions for monotonic convergence to a unique steady state are
derived. Otherwise, cyclic behaviour of wage shares is inevitable. A wage de-
crease can occur if strike is credible, but never when strike is not credible. In
the limit, as time between bargaining rounds vanishes, this paradox survives.
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1 Introduction
The strategic wage bargaining model in Fernandez and Glazer [3], Haller [4]
and Haller and Holden [5] is extended to allow for multiple wage contract rene-
gotiations and productivity growth, by making the following more realistic as-
sumptions. First, the parties can only agree upon short-term contracts. Second,
contracts are incomplete in two different ways, namely a contract specifies a
nominal wage that remains constant until it expires (i.e. wages cannot be con-
tingent upon productivity growth) and future behaviour after the expiration date
cannot be included in the contract. Third, the last expired contract remains in
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place until it is replaced by a new one. The latter is in accordance with the com-
mon practice in many Western countries, where it is forbidden by law that a firm
unilaterally lowers wages after the expiration of a central agreement without the
workers’ consent, e.g. Holden [6].
In Fernandez and Glazer [3], Haller [4] and Haller and Holden [5] it is
shown that wage increases only occur in case the union’s threat of going on
strike is credible. Furthermore, in Fernandez and Glazer [3] a brief remark is
made with respect to short-term contracts: The union’s minimum and maximum
equilibrium1 utility is not affected by assuming short-term contracts. The strate-
gies that support this maximum equilibrium utility mimic everlasting contracts
by having immediate agreement upon a wage increase equal to the wage increase
under everlasting contracts in the first short-term contract and, after the expira-
tion of this first contract, all future negotiations are immediately concluded with
a short-term contract that features no wage increase. Our interpretation of these
‘just one wage increase ever’ strategies is as follows: The union is very militant
in the first contract’s negotiations by exploiting the threat of strike, while it be-
haves very peacefully in all future contracts’ negotiations by refraining from this
threat.
Since some unions are notorious for their aggressive behaviour it is more
interesting to adapt the maximum equilibrium wage strategies such that the union
uses the threat of strike whenever this threat is credible and only refrains from
this threat in case it is not credible. The aim of our analysis is to investigate this
particular ‘militant union’ equilibrium (MUE).2 By doing so, the credibility issue
is put into a dynamic context. Since both parties take into consideration how the
current contract will affect future contracts’ negotiations more interesting wage
dynamics result than in Fernandez and Glazer [3].
Our model is formulated in terms of wage shares with the understanding that
a new wage is negotiated. The union’s MUE utility does not depend upon the
length of the short-term contract, meaning that it is without loss of generality
to assume everlasting contracts or, equivalently, ‘just one wage increase ever’
strategies, in deriving this utility. The ‘just one wage increase ever’ equilibrium
and the MUE impose different paths of wage shares over time. Rational parties
are indifferent between these two paths of wages. Psychologically, however, the
MUE path may be enjoyed because wages keep up with profits, which might be
considered ‘fair’.
The union’s threat of strike is only credible if the wage share is smaller than
a certain threshold and the union’s MUE utility depends upon whether or not
strike is credible. The MUE dynamics for the wage share are derived from the
union’s MUE utility. For a large class of parameter values there is monotonic
convergence towards to a unique steady state wage share. Otherwise, there is no
steady state and cyclical behaviour is inevitable.
1 By equilibrium we mean subgame perfect equilibrium.
2 As in Fernandez and Glazer [3] and Haller and Holden [5] it is possible to derive inefficient
equilibria which feature strike. Since doing so is by now a routine exercise, it is omitted.
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There is a subclass of parameter values for which a voluntary decrease in the
wage share (and also the wage) occurs. Such a decrease never occurs if strike
fails as a credible weapon in the current and next contract’s negotiations, but can
occur either if strike is currently credible and the wage share is sufficiently high,
or if strike is not currently credible but will be credible at the next contract’s
negotiations. Since credibility of strike is associated with a wage increase this
result is counter intuitive. Wage decreases can only last for a short number of
wage contracts and after that wages are forever increasing. Thus, a decrease in
the wage share redistributes wages (and profits) over time in such a way that the
long-run MUE wages must overtake the long-run wages corresponding to a path
consisting of holdout until MUE wage increases can be negotiated.
Finally, following Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1], we let the time
between proposals vanish. In this limit strike is always credible for the union
independent of the wage share and there is monotonic convergence to a unique
steady state wage share. The union is unable to grasp the entire surplus. In this
limit, the counter intuitive result of a decrease in the wage share survives.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we derive the union’s MUE
utility. The MUE wage dynamics and conditions for a wage decrease are derived
in Section 4. In Section 5 the long run evolution of wage shares is analyzed. The
limit behaviour of the MUE as the time between bargaining rounds vanishes is
investigated in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper, while the next section
introduces the model.
2 The model
Our wage bargaining model is basically the wage bargaining model in Fernandez
and Glazer [3], Haller [4] and Haller and Holden [5] in which the assumption of
an everlasting contract is dropped and exogenous productivity growth is included.
Time is discrete and time t ∈ N. In order to establish notation we define T ,
T ∈ N\ {0}, as the contract length and π − 1, π > 1, as the growth rate of
productivity corresponding to a learning-by-doing technology. The initial revenue
generated by the firm is normalized to 1, meaning πt is the revenue at time t .
A holdout3 is assumed to be Pareto efficient,4 with per period payoff wt for the
union at time t (wt is the wage specified by the last contract’s wage which is
either still valid or expired at time t) and the firm’s profit at time t is equal
to πt − wt . Each party’s payoff at time t corresponding to strike is normalized
to 0. The union is only allowed to strike at time t if at time t the last agreed
upon contract has expired. If one of the parties receives the infinite sequence of
payoffs 〈xt 〉∞t=0, where xt is the payoff at time t , then the normalized payoff to
this party is simply (1− δ)∑∞t=0 δt xt , δ ∈ (0, 1), where δ denotes the common
discount factor, or, alternatively, the probability for a next period. We assume
3 A holdout means that workers engage in production under the terms of the last expired contract.
4 A discussion of inefficient holdouts is postponed to the concluding remarks.
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that π < δ−1 in order to ensure that the surplus (1− δ)∑∞τ=t δτ−tπτ = 1−δ1−δπ ·πt
is well defined.
The bargaining process is identical to Fernandez and Glazer [3]. At bargaining
round t , t even, the union demands a wage and at round t , t odd, the firm offers
a wage. In case a proposed wage is rejected, the union can either strike for
one round or holdout. An agreed upon (wage) contract w lasts T rounds, after
which bargaining starts over again. There are no negotiations or strikes during
the validation time of a contract. Note that w influences future negotiations by
specifying the disagreement payoff in these negotiations. It is necessary to specify
which party restarts the negotiations after the expiration of each contract. In order
to make the calculations less tedious we impose that T is even, which means
that if a party proposes a wage that is accepted in round t , then this party is the
proposing party at the restart of the negotiations at t + T .
The following reinterpretation of our model shows the resemblances and
differences with the model of Fernandez and Glazer [3]. The settlement wage wt
at round t determines the wage share wt/πt at this period and vice versa. Thus,
it can be said that at round t the parties negotiate for the wage share, denoted as
yt , with the understanding that they negotiate the wage. If the parties agree upon
the wage share y at round t , then the wage will be equal to y · πt for the next T
rounds starting at t and meanwhile the wage share yt+τ = π−τy , τ = 0, . . . ,T−1,
declines over time due to productivity growth. So, our model introduces declining
wage shares over time into the framework of Fernandez and Glazer [3] combined
with short-term contracts. Alternatively, nominal wages and inflation lead to a
declining real wage over time, e.g. Holden [6]. In order to facilitate a comparison
with the results in the literature, our analysis will be in terms of the wage share.
Note that wt ∈
(
0, 1−δ1−δπ · πt
]
translates into yt ∈
(
0, 1−δ1−δπ
]
, where 1−δ1−δπ >
1. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that the firm has access to a perfect capital
market in case yt > 1. This assumption is without loss of generality, because the
main results in this paper can also be derived if yt ∈ (0, 1].
This reinterpretation also implies that the firm is more patient than the union.
During the terms of an agreement the entire productivity growth accrues to the
firm, because the wage to be paid remains fixed. So, effectively the firm has
δπ > δ as its discount factor. For the union the wage share during an agreement
declines at the rate of π−1 per round, partially offsetting the discount factor
δπ. So, the union still values the future with discount factor equal to δ and is
therefore less patient than the firm. Fortunately, the critique in Bolt [2] does not
apply.
Finally, the declining wage share is associated with π > 1. For π = 1 the
wage share does not decline. So, the fundamentals of the model under π > 1
change at the border case π = 1, i.e. there is a discontinuity at π = 1 in the
dynamics of the model. The results for π = 1 are briefly discussed in the relevant
sections.
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3 The militant union equilibrium utilities
In this section we derive the union’s MUE utility. As in Fernandez and Glazer
[3], Haller [4] and Haller and Holden [5] the union’s minimum equilibrium utility
is yt · πt = wt , because the union can secure this payoff simply by holding out
forever and never proposing nor agreeing upon wage shares that prescribe a share
below yt . Furthermore, similar as in the references above, the union’s maximum
equilibrium utility is attained if the union adopts the threat of a stutter strike,
i.e. strike if the firm declines a proposal and hold out if the union declines an
offer. However, there is a threshold θ, θ > 0,5 and the MUE strategies prescribe
stutter strike iff yt ≤ θ. Otherwise, i.e. yt > θ, the union resorts to holdout. The
level of θ we are interested in is the maximum level at which stutter strike is
credible. So, the militant union threatens to go on stutter strike whenever it is
credible and it resorts to holdout otherwise. If the union does not carry out the
threat of a stutter strike in case yt ≤ θ, then an immediate switch to the strategies
corresponding to the union’s minimum equilibrium utility occurs (no punishment
is necessary for yt > θ). The latter is only needed in the derivation of θ and will
be neglected in the rest of the analysis.
First, let the function V ji (yt , t), i , j = 1, 2, denote party i ’s equilibrium con-
tinuation payoff at the start of round t and from this round onward when party
j is the proposing party as function of yt . The militant union strategies feature
immediate agreement at the expiration date of an old contract and, therefore, this
equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Since V jU (yt , t) is the normalized discounted value
of an infinite stream of wages and V jF (yt , t) is the firm’s value for the stream of
revenues minus the discounted stream of wages (with the same discount factor)
we have that V jU (yt , t) + V jF (yt , t) = 1−δ1−δππt , j = U ,F . Thus, the firm’s value
functions V jF (yt , t) = 1−δ1−δππt − V jU (yt , t) can be ignored.
Second, if the wage share at t , t even, exceeds the threshold θ, then stutter
strike is not credible. However, due to the productivity growth, going on strike
will become credible at t + ∗ (yt ), where ∗ (yt ) is the smallest even integer that
solves
∗ (yt ) = arg min
/2∈N
, s.t. yt · π− ≤ θ.
Note that ∗ (yt ) = 0 in case yt ≤ θ at t even. For t is odd, strike becomes
credible at t + ∗
(
yt · π−1
)
+ 1.
The following proposition characterizes the union’s MUE utility and the
threshold θ. All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Proposition 1 The value function V UU (yt , t), t even, is given by
V UU (yt , t) =

[
δ
1+δ yt +
1−δ
1−δ2π2
]
πt , yt ≤ δ
2π2(1−δ2)
1−δ2π2 ,[
1+δ−δ∗ (yt )
1+δ yt +
(1−δ)(δπ)∗ (yt )
1−δ2π2
]
πt , yt >
δ2π2(1−δ2)
1−δ2π2 .
Moreover, V UU (yt , t) ≥ yt · πt for all yt ∈
[
0, 1−δ1−δπ
]
.
5 Actually, θ is the level for all t that are even, while the level for t odd is simply πθ.
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The threshold θ = δ
2π2(1−δ2)
1−δ2π2 ∈
(
δ2 1−δ1−δπ ,
1−δ
1−δπ
)
is increasing in π, π ∈ (1, δ−1).
Thus, productivity growth relaxes the credibility constraint. Furthermore, the
value function is independent of the contract length and, therefore, also holds
for everlasting contracts, i.e. T = ∞. Thus, the value function also represents
the union’s utility associated with the maximum wage equilibrium strategies in
Fernandez and Glazer [3] if productivity growth would be incorporated. Conse-
quently, the latter strategies and the MUE strategies only differ with respect to
the intertemporal distribution of per-round utilities.
The value function is discontinuous and non-monotonic at yt = π2kθ, k ∈
N, because ∗
(
π2kθ
)
= 2k < 2k + 2 = ∗ (yt ) for yt ∈
(
π2kθ, π2(k+1)θ
]
. The
coefficient 1+δ−δ
2k
1+δ of the linear term jumps upwards if k increases, while the
constant term (1−δ)(δπ)
2k
1−δ2π2 jumps downward if k increases. Thus, slightly increasing
yt at π2kθ means that the value function jumps downward and that the slope of
this linear function becomes steeper. Furthermore, as π decreases the number of
points where the value function is discontinuous increases, because each interval(
π2kθ, π2(k+1)θ
]
contracts.
The results for the case π = 1 can be derived similarly as in the proof
of Propositions 1 after substitution of π = 1 and a minor modification due to
∗ (yt ) = ∞ for yt > θ. Then the same expressions as in Fernandez and Glazer
[3] result, i.e.
V UU (yt , t) =
{
δ
1+δ yt +
1
1+δ , yt ≤ δ2,
yt , yt > δ2,
which is only discontinuous at yt = θ = δ2. Furthermore, if π = 1, then the
union’s utility is stuck at yt if yt > θ, whereas π > 1 implies that the union’s
utility increases even if yt > θ. So, the discontinuity in the dynamics of the
model is reflected in a discontinuity in the results for π = 1 and π > 1.
4 The militant union equilibrium proposals
In this section the dynamics of the wage share under MUE strategies are derived.
Since T is even the MUE strategies induce an infinite sequence of consecutive
contracts that are all proposed by the union and, therefore, we restrict attention
to the wage share proposed by the union. Basically, the wage share y proposed
by the union is the solution of(
1− δT ) y · πt + δT V UU (y · π−T , t + T) = V UU (yt , t) , (1)
where y · π−T is the wage share at the expiration date of the contract. The value
function of Proposition 1 is not monotonic and, therefore, not invertible. This
means that (1) can admit more than one solution y in case the solution for y
is larger than πT θ. However, this is not automatically true for all y > πT θ.
Furthermore, the discontinuities in the value function would carry over to the
MUE proposal. In order to avoid these complications, we approximate ∗ (yt )
with (lnπ)−1 ln ytθ if yt > θ. Thus, for yt > θ,
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V UU (yt , t) =
[
1 + δ − δ(lnπ)−1 ln ytθ
1 + δ
yt +
(1− δ) (δπ)(lnπ)−1 ln ytθ
1− δ2π2
]
πt
=
[
yt + (1− δ)
(yt
θ
)1+ ln δln π ]
πt ,
where the latter expression follows after making use of a = e ln a =
( yt
θ
)ln a/ lnπ
.
The approximated value function is continuous in yt and coincides with the true
value function if yt = π2kθ, k ∈ N. The countable number of points on the interval(
θ, 1−δ1−δπ
]
for which the two functions coincide goes to infinity as π goes to 1,
which is the case in Section 6. So, the continuous value function approximates
the true value function for π close enough to 1. The approximation overestimates
the true value function, because implicitly it is as if the union proposes at real
time t + (lnπ)−1 ln ytθ ≤ t + ∗ (yt ), t even. This bias has two opposite effects:
If the approximation is used in the right hand side of (1), i.e. yt > θ, then y
adjusts upwards. Whereas, if the approximation is used in the left hand side, i.e.
y > πT θ, then y adjusts downwards.
The next proposition only states the wage share proposed by the union in case
this party did not deviate in the past, because otherwise the union’s minimum
equilibrium utility strategies prescribe y(yt ) = yt .
Proposition 2 At round t , t even, the union proposes y (yt ) given by
δ
1+δ−δT yt +
(1−δTπT )(1−δ2)
(1+δ−δT )(1−δ2π2) , if yt ≤ min {θ∗, θ} ,
y∗, if yt ∈ (θ∗, θ] ,
y˜ , if yt ∈ (θ,R1)
1+δ
1+δ−δT yt +
1+δ
1+δ−δT
(
(1− δ) ( ytθ )1+ ln δln π − δTπT (1−δ)1−δ2π2 ) , if yt ∈ [R1,R2]
∩
(
θ, 1−δ1−δπ
]
,
yt , if yt ∈
(
R2, 1−δ1−δπ
]
where y∗ > πT θ > yt is the largest of the two real roots of
y + (1− δ)
(y
θ
)1+ ln δln π − δ
1 + δ
yt − 1− δ1− δ2π2 = 0, (2)
y˜ > πT θ > yt is the largest of the two real roots of
y + (1− δ)
(y
θ
)1+ ln δln π − yt − (1− δ)(yt
θ
)1+ ln δln π
= 0, (3)
the threshold θ∗ = δ−3π−2
[(
1 + δ − δT ) δ2πT +2 − (1− δTπT )] · θ and R1 ≤
πT θ ≤ R2 are the two positive, real roots of
x + (1− δ)
(x
θ
)1+ ln δln π − 1− δ
1− δ2π2π
T (δT + δ2π2 (1 + δ − δT )) = 0.
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A discussion of these results is postponed. First, two mutually exclusive cases
are distinguished, namely θ∗ < θ and θ∗ ≥ θ, for which sharper results can be
obtained. The case θ∗ ≥ θ reduces to the following condition
δ2π2 ≤ δ−1 (πT +2 (δ2 + δ3) + δTπT (1− δ2π2)− 1) . (4)
Figure 1. Condition (4) in (δ, π)-space, T = 10
Figure 1 illustrates condition (4). This condition is satisfied for all points on
or above the lower curve and below the upper curve π = δ−1. As T increases
the lower curve shifts downwards, thereby enlarging this area. Therefore, there
is a nonempty area of positive measure in the (δ, π,T )-space for which condition
(4) holds. The area of condition (4) is separated from the line π = 1. Similar
considerations hold for the subclass excluded by condition (4).
4.1 The case condition (4) holds
The first proposition discards two of the five cases of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 If condition (4) is satisfied, then min {θ∗, θ} = θ, (θ∗, θ] = ∅,
(θ,R1) = ∅ and [R1,R2] ∩ (θ, 1] =
(
θ, πT θ
]
in Proposition 2. Moreover, yt ≤ θ
implies y (yt ) · π−T ≤ θ.
The first case, yt ∈
(
πT θ, 1−δ1−δπ
]
, corresponds to  (yt ) > T . That is, the
union fails strike as a credible weapon for more than T rounds. Disagreement
means holdout will prevail in these rounds and, therefore, the firm can postpone
an increase in the wage share at no cost, which it does, i.e., y (yt ) = yt . This
confirms the intuition in the literature. Strike becomes credible within  (yt ) < T
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rounds in the second case, yt ∈
(
θ, πT θ
]
. Then strike is currently not credible,
but it is credible at the expiration date of y (yt ). Thus, the militant union has one
more contract to go before strike becomes credible. The union faces a dilemma,
disagree and hold out until t +  (yt ) at which strike becomes available, or nego-
tiate a new contract now. Impatience makes the union willing to accept a wage
share today in order to avoid waiting until t +  (yt ). The third case, yt ∈ [0, θ],
corresponds to strike is both credible in the current and next contract’s negotia-
tions. Note that once strike is credible it remains credible in all future contracts’
negotiations, i.e. y (yt ) · π−T ≤ θ for yt ≤ θ.
The next proposition implies that the union does not always negotiate a larger
wage share.
Proposition 4 Suppose condition (4) holds. If 1−δTπT
δ2π2(1−δT ) < 1, then
y (yt ) < yt ⇔ yt ∈
(
1− δTπT
δ2π2
(
1− δT )θ, πT θ
]
/= ∅.
Remark 1 The condition is necessary and sufficient for a decrease in the wage
share if yt ∈
(
1−δTπT
δ2π2(1−δT )θ, θ
]
. Furthermore, in case 1−δ
TπT
δ2π2(1−δT ) ≥ 1 then there
exists some λ > 1 such that a decrease in the wage share occurs if yt ∈
(
λθ, πT θ
]
even.6
Figure 2. Proposition 4 in (δ, π)-space, T = 10
The condition 1−δ
TπT
δ2π2(1−δT ) < 1 is satisfied for all points above the middle of
the three curves in Figure 2. Moreover, according to Figure 2 the area of this
6 The bound λθ corresponds to one of two roots of the polynomial in the proof of Proposition 4.
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condition is contained in the area corresponding to condition (4) bounded by
the lowest curve. We conjecture that this holds for any triple (δ, π,T ).7 Finally,
the area in the (δ, π,T )-space for which the condition 1−δTπT
δ2π2(1−δT ) < 1 holds has
positive measure, because substitution of π = δ−1 implies 0 < 1 for all T .
The result in Proposition 4 differs from the results in the literature where an
increase in the wage (share) is identified with strike being credible. Clearly, it is
counter intuitive that a decrease in the wage share (and the wage itself) occurs in
or near the region where strike is credible, but not where strike is not credible.
This implies that for the union the initial wage decrease is compensated with an
acceleration of the increase of the wage share in the future.
4.2 The case condition (4) does not hold
The next proposition states that all five cases of Proposition 2 occur if condition
(4) does not hold.
Proposition 5 If condition (4) does not hold, then min {θ∗, θ} = θ∗, (θ∗, θ] /= ∅,
(θ,R1) /= ∅ and [R1,R2] ∩ (θ, 1] = [R1,R2] /= ∅ in Proposition 2.
The first case, yt ∈ [0, θ∗], corresponds to strike is both credible in the current
and next contract’s negotiations. The union always negotiates a larger wage
share.8 The second case, yt ∈ (θ∗, θ], is the transition from strike is credible in
the current contract’s negotiations to strike is not credible at the next contract’s
negotiations. So, the militant union has one more contract to go before strike
ceases to be credible. The negotiated wage share is larger than the current wage
share, because y (yt ) = y∗ > πT θ > yt . The third case, yt ∈ (θ,R1), with R1 <
πT θ, corresponds to strike is not credible before t +  (yt ), where  (yt ) < T , at
the current contract’s negotiations and it will neither be credible at the expiration
date of y (yt ) = y˜ . Despite the fact that strike is not credible the union negotiates
a substantially larger wage share y˜ > πT θ > yt . The reason is that both parties
anticipate the large increase of the wage share at t +  (yt ) of the second case
if they would not agree for the next  (yt ) < T rounds and impatience makes
the union willing to accept a lower increase in the wage share today in order
to avoid the waiting. The fourth case, yt ∈ [R1,R2], corresponds to the situation
in which strike is not credible at time t but strike is credible at the expiration
date of y (yt ). Thus, the militant union has one more contract to go before strike
becomes credible. Conditions for a decrease in the negotiated wage share are
not derived. The last case, yt ∈
(
R2, 1−δ1−δπ
]
, with R2 ≥ πT θ, corresponds to
 (yt ) > T , i.e. the union lacks strike as a credible weapon now and at the end
of the new contract. In that case there is no increase in the wage share, because
the future threat of strike lies too far away in the future.
7 For 10.000 random triples (δ, π, T ) we numerically verified whether condition (4) holds if the
condition of Proposition 4 holds. For all cases this was found true.
8 This follows directly from the proof of Proposition 6 below, where monotonic convergence to
x∗ is shown, and x∗ > θ if condition (4) does not hold.
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5 The wage share in the long run
Similar as in the previous section we distinguish two exclusive cases.
5.1 The case condition (4) holds
The dynamics on [0, θ] admit a steady state wage share and, moreover, there
is monotonic convergence to this steady state. The wage share x∗ ∈ [0, 1] is a
steady state wage share if yt = x∗ implies that y (yt ) ·π−T = x∗. So, at time t + T ,
i.e. the expiration date of y (yt ), the wage share will be equal to the wage share
at t .
Proposition 6 If condition (4) is satisfied, then there is monotonic convergence
in wage shares to
x∗ =
(
1− δTπT )
δ2π2
(
πT
(
1 + δ − δT )− δ)θ ≤ θ
for all yt ∈
[
0, 1−δ1−δπ
]
. Moreover, if 1−δTπT
δ2π2(1−δT ) < 1, then x∗ <
1−δTπT
δ2π2(1−δT )θ < θ.
Note that the wage share (and, consequently, also the wage) is forever mono-
tonically increasing if the initial wage share lies below x∗. However, if initially
the wage share lies above x∗, then even a militant union which has strike as
a credible option at its disposal cannot prevent that the wage share will de-
crease over time. A decrease in the wage share cannot be ruled out according to
Proposition 4. The number of consecutive contracts featuring a wage decrease is
bounded from above, because the long-run wage share approximates x∗ and an
increase to πT x∗ is needed in order to sustain the steady state wage share. So,
after a finite number of contracts, wages exceed the initial level.
5.2 The case condition (4) does not hold
If condition (4) does not hold, then the steady state x∗ of Proposition 6 exceeds θ
and lies outside the interval [0, θ∗]. Still the wage share monotonically increases
over time on the domain [0, θ∗] and, eventually, after a finite number of contracts,
the wage share will be larger than θ∗.9 It follows that we have cyclical behaviour
of wage shares.
This can be seen as follows. After yt has left the interval [0, θ], yt enters
either the interval [R1,R2] or (θ,R1)∪
(
R2, 1−δ1−δπ
)
. In the former case, the wage
share at the end of the contract is in the interval [0, θ], in the latter case it could
either stay in this interval or enter the interval [R1,R2]. The most one can obtain
9 This follows directly from the proof of Proposition 6 if
[
0, 1−δ1−δπ
]
is taken as the domain of
the dynamics and observing that monotonic convergence to x∗ on
[
0, 1−δ1−δπ
]
holds even if x∗ > θ.
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are limit cycles (if these exist at all). This is illustrated in the next numerical
example.
Take δ = 0.8, π = 1.02, T = 4. Then θ∗ = 0.6, θ = 0.717, R1 = 0.777 and
R2 = 0.799. It turns out that in this case, independent of the starting value y0, the
evolution of the wage share converges to the cycle described in Table 1. Note
that in this case a wage decrease occurs for yt ∈ [R1,R2].
Table 1
Current wage share Interval Proposal
0.778 [R1,R2] 0.776
0.717 (θ∗, θ) 0.897
0.829 (R2, 1−δ1−δπ ) 0.829
0.766 (θ,R1) 0.812
0.750 (θ,R1) 0.834
0.770 (θ,R1) 0.807
0.745 (θ,R1) 0.842
0.778 [R1,R2] 0.776
Finally, the line π = 1 is one of the boundaries of the area where condition
(4) does not hold. For π = 1 we obtain (θ,R1) = ∅ and [R1,R2] = ∅ in Proposition
2.10 Thus,
y (yt ) =

δ
1+δ−δT yt +
1−δT
1+δ−δT , if yt ∈
[
0, δ2 − 1−δ2δ
]
,
δ
1+δ yt +
1
1+δ , if yt ∈
(
δ2 − 1−δ2δ , δ2
]
,
yt , if yt ∈
(
δ2, 1
]
,
for sufficiently large δ < 1. We mention that i) only a finite number of wage
increases can take place and ii) the last contract featuring a wage increase spec-
ifies a wage in between δ2 and 1 − δ (1− δ) < 1. Hence, π = 1 and MUE
strategies impose a wage ceiling and once strike ceases to be credible it remains
not credible forever. So, for π = 1 there is a wage ceiling above θ = δ2 while
cyclic behaviour results for π > 1. So, the discontinuity in the model at π = 1
translates to a discontinuity in results.
6 Limit results
In this section we follow the literature on strategic bargaining by letting the
time between bargaining rounds vanish (e.g. Binmore et al. [1]) and, meanwhile,
maintaining a constant level of the contract length measured in real time.
In order to make the analysis precise we define ∆, ∆ > 0, as the time
between two bargaining rounds, δ = e−r∆, where r denotes the interest rate,
10 The following statements can be derived similarly as in the proof of Proposition 2 after substi-
tution of π = 1 and a minor modification due to  (yt ) = ∞ in case yt > δ2. Furthermore, [R1,R2]
is empty, because once yt > θ strike remains not credible forever.
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and π = eρ∆, where ρ denotes the growth rate of productivity. The assumption
1 < π < δ−1 implies that 0 < ρ < r . The contract length L ∈ R++ is measured
in real time. Since L = T∆ and L is kept constant T has to adjust if ∆ goes to
0, i.e. T = L/∆.11 For simplicity we neglect that T = L/∆ should be an even
integer. The following theorem states the limit results.
Theorem 1 In the limit, as ∆ goes to 0, strike is credible for every yt ∈
[
0, r
r−ρ
]
,
the union proposes the wage share 12−eρL
[
yt +
(
1− e−(r−ρ)L) r
r−ρ
]
and its MUE
utility is 12
[
yt + rr−ρ
]
eρt . Moreover, there is monotonic convergence in wage
shares to (1−e
−(r−ρ)L)r
(eρL(2−e−rL)−1)(r−ρ) <
r
r−ρ and the wage share decreases if yt ∈( (1−e−(r−ρ)L)r
(1−e−rL)(r−ρ) ,
r
r−ρ
]
/= ∅.
The threshold θ (and 1−δ1−δπ ) converges to rr−ρ as the time between bargaining
rounds vanishes. The reason is that the equilibrium condition for strike to be
credible is given by yt ·eρt ≤
(
1− e−r∆) ·0+e−r∆V FU (yt · e−ρ∆, t + 1), t even.
Since V FU
(
yt · e−ρ∆, t + 1
)
> yt · eρt for all ∆ > 0 this condition requires e−r∆
sufficiently close to 1, which holds for sufficiently small ∆ > 0. This equilibrium
condition easily generalizes to a large class of extended models, provided yt ·eρt is
replaced by the union’s minimum equilibrium utility in such model. Furthermore,
the union is unable to grasp the entire surplus r
r−ρe
ρt
. A decrease in the wage
share will occur for sufficiently large wage shares.
Finally, the union’s limit MUE utility corresponds to the Nash bargaining
solution with everlasting contracts and disagreement point
(
yt · eρt , 0
)
, because
max
w
(
w − yt · eρt
)( r
r − ρ · e
ρt − w
)
⇒ w = 1
2
(
yt +
r
r − ρ
)
eρt .
This means that the limit results can be obtained by a simple two-step procedure.
First, compute the union’s limit MUE utility by applying this Nash bargaining
solution and, second, derive the dynamics of the wage share from this utility.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have extended the wage bargaining model by Fernandez and
Glazer [3], Haller [4] and Haller and Holden [5], by allowing for finite con-
tract length and productivity growth. By doing so, credibility over time of the
strike threat enters the analysis. However, the credibility issue vanishes as time
between bargaining rounds goes to zero and matters simplify in the limit. The
results then hint that a large class of extended models can be analyzed using
11 Note that keeping T fixed would mean that L = T∆→ 0 as ∆→ 0. Then, in the limit, parties
would constantly negotiate new contracts which expire instantaneously at the moment of conclusion.
Clearly, this is unrealistic.
94 H. Houba and G. van Lomwel
the Nash bargaining solution with the appropriate disagreement points. For in-
stance one could think of inefficient holdouts, e.g. Holden [6] and Moene [8],
or introducing competition among strategic options for the union, such as hold-
out, work-to-rule and strike, e.g. Houba and Bolt [7]. Inefficient holdouts only
require a minor modification of the union’s minimum equilibrium utility in our
analysis. Competition among strategic options would not alter the conclusions
of Theorem 1, because in the limit all actions will be credible and strike is the
union’s most effective action among the credible actions.
Our analysis complements the study in Holden [6], where the Nash bargaining
solution determines the nominal wage in a small macroeconomic model with
inflation, endogenous employment, decentralized wage bargaining and one-year
contracts. Furthermore, the credibility issue is not addressed by assuming that the
disagreement point corresponds to inefficient holdout. Our results hint that the
credibility issue vaporizes in the limit and that, alternatively, the disagreement
point corresponding to stutter strike could have been taken. In Holden [6] workers
also have an outside option and conditions for a binding outside option are
derived. So, wage decreases are implicitly present in Holden [6]. Theorem 1 also
hints that this result can still be expected in Holden [6] if a militant union would
be assumed.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose there is a threshold θ such that at t is even strike is credible iff yt ≤ θ.
If yt > θ, then strike becomes credible at t +  “even”, where  denotes  (yt ).
There are two cases to be considered.
Case 1 yt > θ. Then t +  is the first round strike will be credible again and,
hence, V UU (yt+, t + ) corresponds to the function at which strike is credible.
Until t +  strike is not credible and yt · πt is the union’s disagreement payoff.
The firm’s problem at τ + 1, τ = t + − 2, t + − 4, . . . , t (τ even), is given by
1− δ
1− δππ
τ+1 − V FU (yτ+1, τ + 1)
= max
yF
1− δ
1− δππ
τ+1 − (1− δT ) yF · πτ+1 − δT V FU (yF · π−T , τ + T + 1) ,
s.t. (
1− δT ) yF · πτ+1 + δT V FU (yF · π−T , τ + T + 1)
= (1− δ) yτ+1 · πτ+1 + δV UU
(
yτ+1 · π−1, τ + 2
)
.
Substitution of the constraint into the objective function and rewriting yields
V FU (yτ+1, τ + 1) = (1− δ) yτ+1 · πτ+1 + δV UU
(
yτ+1 · π−1, τ + 2
)
. (5)
Similarly, the union’s problem at τ given by
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V UU (yτ , τ ) = maxyU
(
1− δT ) yU · πτ + δT V UU (yU · π−T , τ + T) ,
s.t.
1− δ
1− δππ
τ − (1− δT ) yU · πτ − δT V UU (yU · π−T , τ + T)
=
1− δ
1− δππ
τ − (1− δ) yτ · πτ − δV FU
(
yτ · π−1, τ + 1
)
yields
V UU (yτ , τ ) = (1− δ) yτ · πτ + δV FU
(
yτ · π−1, τ + 1
)
. (6)
Furthermore, if the parties would not agree at τ then at τ + 1 we have that
yτ+1 = yτ ·π−1. Making use of this relation and substitution of (5) into (6) yields
the recursive relation
V UU (yτ , τ ) =
(
1− δ2) yτ ·πτ +δ2V UU (yτ · π−2, τ + 2) , τ = t +−2, t +−4, . . . , t .
Solving the recursion yields
V UU (yt , t) =
(
1− δ) yt · πt + δV UU (yt · π−, t + ) , for yt > θ (7)
and V UU
(
yt · π−, t + 
)
refers to case 2, i.e. yt · π− ≤ θ.
Case 2 yt ≤ θ at t even. Then going on strike is credible. The union’s problem
(6) at t , t is even, is different and is now given by
V UU (yt , t) = maxyU
(
1− δT ) yU · πt + δT V UU (yU · π−T , t + T)
s.t.
1− δ
1− δππ
t − (1− δT )wU − δT V UU (wU , πT Ft)
= δ
[
1− δ
1− δππ
t+1 − V FU
(
yt · π−1, t + 1
)]
,
V UU
(
yU · π−T , t + T
)
=
(
1− δ)wU + δV UU (yU · π−T−, t + T + ) .
where  denotes 
(
yU · π−T
)
. The second constraint comes from case 1 and is
necessary in order to take into account yU ’s such that yU ·π−T > θ at t +T . Note
that 
(
yU · π−T
)
= 0 for yU · π−T ≤ θ and then this constraint is superfluous.
As before, substitution of the first constraint into the objective function yields
V UU (yt , t) = (1− δπ)
1− δ
1− δππ
t + δV FU
(
yt · π−1, t + 1
)
. (8)
The firm’s problem at t + 1, t is even, does not change and, hence, equation (5)
is also valid in this case for τ + 1 = t + 1. If the parties would not agree at t , t is
even, then at t + 1 (odd) we have that yt+1 = yt · π−1. Making use of this relation
and substitution of (5) (for τ + 1 = t + 1) into (8) yields
V UU (yt , t) = (1− δ)πt + δ (1− δ) yt ·πt + δ2V UU
(
yt · π−2, t + 2
)
, for yt ≤ θ. (9)
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It is easy to verify that
V UU (yt , t) =
[
δ
1 + δ
yt +
1− δ
1− δ2π2
]
πt , for yt ≤ θ,
is a solution of (9). Then the expression in (7) becomes
V UU (yt , t) =
[
1 + δ − δ
1 + δ
yt +
(1− δ) δπ
1− δ2π2
]
πt , for yt > θ. (10)
It is easy to verify that V UU (yt , t) ≥ yt · πt for all yt .
Finally, strike at t , t even, is credible iff yt ·πt ≤ (1− δ)·0+δV FU
(
yt · π−1, t + 1
)
.
At t is odd, we have
V FU (yt , t) = (1− δ) + yt · πt + δV UU
(
yt · π−1, t + 1
)
=
δ
1 + δ
yt +
(1− δ) δπ
1− δ2π2 ,
for yt ≤ πθ. Solving for θ in θ = δV FU
(
θ · π−1, t + 1) yields θ = δ2π2 1−δ21−δ2π2 as
the threshold postulated at the beginning of the proof. QED
Proof of Proposition 2. The two expressions for V UU on both sides of (1) imply
four different cases.
First, if yt ≤ θ and y · π−T ≤ θ, then y solves (1) iff(
1− δT ) y + δT ( δ
1 + δ
y · π−T + 1− δ
1− δ2π2
)
πT =
δ
1 + δ
yt +
1− δ
1− δ2π2 ,
which yields the solution
y =
δ
1 + δ − δT yt +
(
1− δTπT ) (1− δ2)(
1 + δ − δT ) (1− δ2π2) .
The condition y · π−T ≤ θ can be rewritten as
yt ≤ δ−1 1− δ
2
1− δ2π2
(
δTπT
(
1− δ2π2) + πT +2 (δ2 + δ3)− 1) ≡ θ∗.
Combining the two conditions yt ≤ θ and y · π−T ≤ θ yields yt ≤ min {θ∗, θ}.
Second, if yt > θ and y · π−T ≤ θ, then y solves (1) iff(
1− δT ) y + δT ( δ
1 + δ
y · π−T + 1− δ
1− δ2π2
)
πT = yt + (1− δ)
(yt
θ
)1+ ln δln π
.
Solving for y yields
y =
1 + δ
1 + δ − δT yt +
1 + δ
1 + δ − δT
(
(1− δ)
(yt
θ
)1+ ln δln π − δTπT (1− δ)
1− δ2π2
)
.
The condition y · π−T ≤ θ can be rewritten as
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yt + (1− δ)
(yt
θ
)1+ ln δln π − 1− δ
1− δ2π2π
T (δT + δ2π2 (1 + δ − δT )) ≤ 0. (11)
The polynomial is decreasing for yt small and increasing for yt large, because
1 + ln δlnπ < 0 implies limx→0 x
1+ ln δln π = +∞ and limx→∞ x 1+ ln δln π = 0, i.e. the graph
is U-shaped. Furthermore, yt = πT θ is one real root, because
(
πT
)1+ ln δln π
= δTπT .
Therefore, there exist two positive, real roots, i.e. R1 ≤ πT θ ≤ R2. Combining
yt > θ and y · π−T ≤ θ yields yt ∈ [R1,R2] ∩
(
θ, 1−δ1−δπ
]
.
Third, if yt > θ and y · π−T > θ, then y solves (1) iff
(
1− δT ) y+δT (y · π−T + (1− δ)(y · π−T
θ
)1+ ln δln π)
πT = yt +(1− δ)
(yt
θ
)1+ ln δln π
,
which can be rewritten as stated in (3) by making use of (π−T )1+ ln δln π = δ−Tπ−T .
By the same arguments as applied to (11) in the second case, (3) is U-shaped
in y and there exist two positive, real roots S1 < S2, because y = yt is one of them.
Next, we prove that S1 < πT θ < S2, i.e. S2 · π−T > θ, for all yt ∈ (θ,R1) ∪(
R2, 1−δ1−δπ
]
, where the latter set results from yt > θ and discarding [R1,R2] of
the second case. The arguments are as follows. Consider (3) at y = πT θ as a
function of yt ∈ (θ,R1) ∪
(
R2, 1−δ1−δπ
]
. Substitution of y = πT θ into (3) yields
πT θ + (δπ)T (1− δ)− yt − (1− δ)
(yt
θ
)1+ ln δln π
,
which can be rewritten as
πT
(1− δ)
1− δ2π2
(
δ2π2
(
1 + δ − δT ) + δT )− yt − (1− δ)(yt
θ
)1+ ln δln π
, (12)
because
πT θ + δTπT (1− δ) = πT
((
1− δ2) δ2π2
1− δ2π2 +
(
1− δ2π2) (1− δ) δT
1− δ2π2
)
= πT
(1− δ)
1− δ2π2
((1 + δ) δ2π2 + δT (1− δ2π2))
= πT
(1− δ)
1− δ2π2
(
δ2π2
(
1 + δ − δT ) + δT ) .
But (12) is equal to minus expression (11). Since (11) is positive for yt ∈ (θ,R1)∪
(R2, 1−δ1−δπ ], as shown in the second case, we have that (12) is negative for such
yt . Hence, S1 < πT θ < S2 and only S2 satisfies y · π−T > θ for all yt ∈
(θ,R1) ∪ (R2, 1−δ1−δπ ]. Finally, y = yt is one root of (3). If θ < yt < R1 ≤ πT θ,
then necessarily S1 = yt < πT θ. Otherwise, S2 = yt > πT θ for yt > πT θ.
Fourth, y < θ and y · π−T > θ. In that case y solves (1) iff
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y + δTπT (1− δ)
(
y · π−T
θ
)1+ ln δln π
=
δ
1 + δ
yt +
1− δ
1− δ2π2 ,
which yields (2). Similarly as in the third case, (2) is U-shaped in y , and has two
positive, real roots. The smallest root is not feasible, i.e. y < πT θ, iff the LHS
of (2) is negative at y = πT θ (because in that case πT θ lies in between the two
roots). Substitution of y = πT θ yields
πT θ + (δπ)T (1− δ)− δ
1 + δ
yt − 1− δ1− δ2π2 .
The latter expression is equal to 0 in yt = θ∗ (see third case) and decreases in yt .
Thus, this expression is negative iff yt > θ∗. The latter is true iff yt > θ∗. Thus,
the unique feasible solution is the largest root of (2) for all yt ∈ (θ∗, θ). QED
Proof of Proposition 3. First, min {θ∗, θ} = θ iff condition (4) holds. Next, (11)
holds for yt = θ, because
(
1− πT ) δ2π2 1+δ1+δπ +(1− δπ) (1− δTπT ) ≤ 0 is equiv-
alent to condition (4). Hence, R1 ≤ θ and R2 = πT θ in the proof of Proposition 2.
Thus,
(
θ, 1−δ1−δπ
]
∩ [R1,R2] =
(
θ, πT θ
]
. Finally, y (yt ) ≤ y (θ) ≤ πT θ iff condition
(4) holds. QED
Proof of Proposition 4. Propositions 2 and 3 imply that a wage decrease cannot
occur for yt ∈
(
πT θ, 1−δ1−δπ
]
. Thus, only yt ≤ θ and yt ∈
(
θ, πT θ
)
have to
be investigated. First, yt ≤ θ. Then y < yt iff yt > (1−δ
TπT )
δ2π2(1−δT )θ. The interval( (1−δTπT )
δ2π2(1−δT )θ, θ
]
is non-empty iff (1−δ
TπT )
δ2π2(1−δT ) < 1. Second, yt ∈
(
θ, πT θ
)
. Then
y < yt iff
δT +2π2
yt
θ
+
(
1− δ2π2) (yt
θ
)1+ ln δln π − δTπT < 0.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 2 it follows that yt = πT θ is one of the two
positive, real roots. This condition holds in yt = θ, i.e. the smallest root is smaller
than θ, iff 1−δ
TπT
δ2π2(1−δT ) < 1. In that case πT θ is necessarily the largest root and the
polynomial is negative for all yt ∈
(
θ, πT θ
]
. QED
Proof of Proposition 5. First, min {θ∗, θ} = θ∗ < θ iff condition (4) does not
hold. Next, from the proof of Proposition 3 it follows that (11) in the proof of
Proposition 2 does not hold for yt = θ if the condition (4) does not hold. Since,
πT θ is one of the two real, positive roots it necessarily follows that both R1 and
R2 are larger than θ. QED
Proof of Proposition 6. Propositions 2 and 3 imply that yt > θ can not be a
steady state, because the wage share monotonically decreases for yt > θ. Denote
the wage share xk as the k -th contract agreed upon at round kT evaluated at
round (k + 1) T . Then for all xk , xk−1 ∈ [0, θ]: xk = π−T
[
axk−1 + b
]
, where
a = δ1+δ−δT < 1 and b =
(1−δTπT )
δ2π2(1+δ−δT )θ. Then x∗ =
(1−δTπT )
δ2π2(πT (1+δ−δT )−δ)θ solves
πT x∗ = ax∗ + b and x∗ ≤ θ is equivalent to condition (4). Next, monotonic
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convergence to x∗ on [0, θ] means that xk ≤ xk−1 for all xk−1 > x∗ and xk ≥ xk−1
for all xk−1 < x∗ for all k . Suppose xk−1 > x∗. Then xk ≤ xk−1 follows from
xk
xk−1
= π−T a +
π−T b
xk−1
≤ π−T a + π
−T b
x∗
=
1
x∗
(
π−T ax∗ + π−T b
)
=
x∗
x∗
= 1
Similar arguments apply for xk−1 < x∗. So, there is monotonic convergence to
x∗ on
[
0, 1−δ1−δπ
]
. Finally, it is easy to verify that x∗ < 1−δ
TπT
δ2π2(1−δT )θ. QED
Proof of Theorem 1. First, in the limit, condition (4) always holds, because
lim
∆→0
δ2π2 ≤ lim
∆→0
δ−1
(
πT +2
(
δ2 + δ3
)
+ δTπT
(
1− δ2π2)− 1)⇔ 1 ≤ (2eρL − 1)
and the latter inequality holds iff ρL ≥ 0, which is assumed. Next, appli-
cation of l’Hoˆpital’s rule yields lim∆→0 1−δ1−δπ =
r
r−ρ and lim∆→0 θ =
r
r−ρ .
So, strike is credible for all yt ∈
[
0, r
r−ρ
]
. Then the limit expressions stated
in the theorem follow trivially from Propositions 1, 2, 6 and 4. Furthermore,
lim∆→0 x∗ = 1−e
−(r−ρ)L
eρL(2−e−rL)−1 ·
r
r−ρ <
r
r−ρ iff ρL > 0. The latter is assumed. Simi-
larly, lim∆→0 x∗ < 1−e
−(r−ρ)L
1−e−rL · rr−ρ iff ρL > 0. Finally,
(
1−e−(r−ρ)L
1−e−rL · rr−ρ , rr−ρ
]
/=
∅ iff ρL > 0. QED
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